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TROLLS & THE PREEMPTION DILEMMA
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Patent trolls account for most patent assertions and are often blamed for the
increased costs of patent litigation. Congress and the courts have tried to wrangle the
abusive practices of trolls. Through a post-grant review system, Congress tried to
combat the growing litigation costs by streamlining invalidity challenges. The Supreme
Court has also tackled the patent-troll problem in seminal remedy and venue cases,
hampering trolls’ ability to get injunctions and use certain venues. Yet the problem
persists. Although Congress and federal courts recognize and sometimes try to alleviate
the patent-troll problem, what can states do to protect small- and medium-sized
businesses from these pesky trolls? For now, probably nothing. The Federal Circuit,
through a preemption analysis influenced by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause,
often invalidates state laws that could regulate the problem. Still, states continue to
try: most states have passed statutes regulating demand letters asserting patent
infringement. These state anti-patent laws’ goal is to protect companies and consumers
from patent trolls. Regardless of whether the current state anti-patent laws will
effectively deter egregious patent-troll behavior, the Federal Circuit’s current
preemption doctrine doesn’t seem to let states promote a legitimate state interest—
protecting businesses from bad-faith behavior so that the businesses can innovate.
But is the Federal Circuit properly reading Supreme Court precedent on
preemption and the Petition Clause? Or are they unnecessarily developing a rigid
rule to help ex ante patentholder decisionmaking? As this Comment argues, even
though the Federal Circuit has improperly morphed the Noerr test into conﬂict
preemption and doesn’t eﬀectively analyze whether Noerr applies to prelitigation
communication and non-antitrust claims, the Federal Circuit’s results aren’t far oﬀ.
There’s good reason for petition immunity to apply to prelitigation activity, like
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demand letters, but the analysis should be separate from conﬂict preemption. It turns
out that the Supreme Court’s rigid approach to the sham exception is partly to blame.
This Comment makes three contributions. The ﬁrst contribution is putting a state
anti-patent law through a full implied-preemption analysis in accordance with
Supreme Court precedent. The second contribution is giving and applying a proper
framework to determine whether the Petition Clause applies to prelitigation
communication and non-antitrust claims. The third contribution is suggesting a
ﬂexible petitioning-immunity framework that will leave states room to regulate
patent-troll demand letters.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent trolls account for most patent assertions and are often blamed for
the increased costs of patent litigation. Congress and the courts have tried to
wrangle the abusive tactics of trolls and their ﬁnancial consequences.
Congress, in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, tried to combat the
growing cost of patent-troll litigation. Congress created a post-grant review
(PGR) system to streamline validity challenges of weak patents.1 It’s unclear
whether the PGR system is a success; the most popular form of review, inter
partes review, has been praised, criticized, and even argued unconstitutional.2
The Supreme Court has also tackled the patent-troll problem. In eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Justice Kennedy, in concurrence,3 directed lower
courts, when considering whether to grant an injunction, to consider whether
the plaintiﬀ was a patent troll.4 And in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC, the Court curbed patent trolls’ favorite litigation venue: the
Eastern District of Texas.5 Although Congress and federal courts recognize
and sometimes try to alleviate the patent-troll problem, can states do
anything to protect small- and medium-sized businesses from these pesky
trolls? For now, probably not. The Federal Circuit, through a preemption
1 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2018) (creating and describing the post-grant-review process); id.
§§ 311–319 (creating and describing the inter partes review process).
2 Recently, the Supreme Court held that the inter partes review system was constitutional. Oil
States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018). Two Justices
disagreed. Id. at 1380 (Roberts, C.J. & Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
3 Justice Kennedy was joined by three other Justices. 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (joined by Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ.).
4 Id. at 396.
5 See 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017) (limiting a corporation’s place of residence under the patent
venue statute); see also Joe Nocera, The Town that Trolls Built, BLOOMBERG: OPINION (May 25, 2017,
2:41 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-05-25/the-texas-town-that-patenttrolls-built-j34rlmjc [https://perma.cc/Z6QH-HB8X] (discussing the Eastern District of Texas as a
favored venue for patent trolls before TC Heartland).
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analysis inﬂuenced by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, invalidates
state laws targeting the problem.6 The Federal Circuit requires that the law
does not punish prelitigation activity unless (1) the litigant’s actions were
objectively baseless and (2) the litigant had a subjective motivation “to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor, through the
use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—
as an anticompetitive weapon.”7 This is the same test the Supreme Court uses
to determine whether petition immunity is pierced.
Still, states continue to try: most states have recently passed statutes
regulating demand letters asserting patent infringement.8 Most states
prohibit “bad faith assertions of patent infringement”9 to protect companies
and consumers from the abusive practices of “non-practicing entities” (NPEs)
or “patent assertion entities”—entities that own and enforce patents but do
not themselves manufacture the patented products.10 These companies are
infamously known as “patent trolls.”11 The emerging statutes are coined “antipatent laws”: state or local laws that weaken patent rights or that make patents
much harder to sell, license, or enforce.12 States can also interfere with federal
patent law by granting patent-like rights through statutes that give aﬃrmative
rights to inventors.13
Surprisingly, not all patent trolls are problematic. Mark Lemley and
Douglas Melamed detail the three patent-troll models and their costs.14 First,
the “lottery-ticket troll,” the “most traditional” troll model, is a company “that
owns a patent and hopes to strike it big in court” against big players in the
industry.15 This troll, unlike the others, relies on the quality of its patents, so
it isn’t exacerbating the bad-faith-assertion-of-patent-infringement problem.16
Second, the “bottom-feeder troll,” the most common troll model, is a company
6 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1628-38 (2015)
(noting that if the infringement allegations aren’t objectively baseless, the current Federal Circuit
doctrine gives patentholders a legal right to lie).
7 Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PRE), 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993)
(cleaned up); see Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
8 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.).
9 E.g., id. § 4197.
10 See id. § 4195 (discussing the Vermont statute’s goal of protecting companies and the state’s
economy as a whole); David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014) (detailing the various names given to NPEs).
11 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 10, at 426.
12 Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133, 137 (2018).
13 Id. at 137 & n.9.
14 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117, 2125-29 (2013).
15 Id. at 2126.
16 See id. at 2128 (describing how “lottery-ticket trolls” craft careful litigation strategies around
patents they genuinely believe to be valuable).
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“interested in quick, low-value settlements for a variety of patents.”17 This
troll relies on the enormous cost of litigation to coerce settlement, regardless
of the quality of their patents or actual infringement.18 Third, “patentaggregator trolls” collect patents, creating patent portfolios that are licensed
out as a bundle.19 This troll depends on the quantity of its owned patents
rather than their quality.20 The “sheer number[]” of patents in a patentaggregator’s portfolio lets this troll “license without litigation because
defendants are reluctant to challenge an entire portfolio of patents.”21 The
emerging state statutes are most concerned with the bottom-feeder troll and
the patent-aggregator troll.22
Current state anti-patent laws could eﬀectively deter egregious patenttroll behavior. But the Federal Circuit, through its conﬂict-preemption
doctrine, often invalidates these laws. In doing so, the Federal Circuit’s
doctrine seems to prevent states from promoting a legitimate state interest:
protecting businesses from bad-faith behavior so that they can use the saved
resources on innovation instead of on litigation and bad licenses. But is the
Federal Circuit, in these conﬂict-preemption decisions, properly reading
Supreme Court precedent on preemption and the First Amendment’s
Petition Clause? Or are they, as scholars have often complained, unnecessarily
developing a rigid rule to help ex ante patentholder decisionmaking?23
As this Comment argues, the Federal Circuit has improperly morphed the
Supreme Court’s petition-immunity test into conﬂict preemption and doesn’t
eﬀectively analyze whether petition immunity applies to prelitigation
communication and non-antitrust claims. But the Federal Circuit’s results
aren’t far oﬀ. There’s good reason for petition immunity to apply to
prelitigation activity, like demand letters, but the analysis should be separate
from conﬂict preemption. It turns out that the Supreme Court’s rigid
approach to the sham exception is partly to blame, at least when applied to
non-antitrust claims involving prelitigation activity.
In ﬁve parts, this Comment makes three contributions:
Id. at 2126.
Id.
Id. at 2126-27.
Id. at 2127.
Id.
For an overview of state statutes, see generally Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent
Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislationguides/patent-progresss-guide-state-patent-legislation/
[https://perma.cc/A3ZY-656H]
(last
updated May 1, 2019). The anti-patent statutes don’t target lottery-ticket trolls because these trolls
rely on the quality of their patents and are therefore likely legitimately enforcing them.
23 See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duﬀy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1660-62 (2007) (criticizing the ossiﬁcation of the Federal Circuit’s rigid
obviousness analysis).
17
18
19
20
21
22
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It puts a state anti-patent law through a full implied-preemption
analysis in accordance with Supreme Court precedent.
It gives and applies a proper framework to determine whether the
Petition Clause applies to prelitigation communication and nonantitrust claims.
It suggests and applies a ﬂexible petitioning-immunity framework
that will leave states room to regulate patent-troll demand letters
while still promoting the purposes of the Petition Clause.

Part I describes the emerging anti-patent laws passed by the majority of the
states. Part II traces the Supreme Court’s intellectual-property preemption
doctrine and petitioning-immunity doctrine. Part III describes the Federal
Circuit’s implementation of Supreme Court precedent and how it morphs
petitioning immunity into conflict preemption. That Part also describes federal
patent law’s enforcement policy. Part IV evaluates three professors’ approaches
to intellectual-property preemption before backing Jeanne Fromer’s approach.
This Part also suggests a proper framework for analyzing the Petition Clause’s
applicability to demand letters asserting patent infringement and the proper
level of protection. Ultimately, for non-antitrust claims involving prelitigation
activity, I suggest a flexible sham test. Part V showcases a stylized example: I
apply the suggested preemption and petitioning-immunity tests to Vermont’s
anti-patent statute.
I. STATE ANTI-PATENT LAWS
Substantive patent law is exclusively federal. But state law controls several
aspects of patents, like areas of ownership and enforcement. For example,
state probate law controls who inherits a patent,24 and state contract law
controls assignment and licensing of a patent.25 States can even expose a
patentholder to liability through “unfair competition, interference with
contract or prospective business advantage, abuse of process, business
disparagement, and antitrust” claims.26
Recently, states have asserted more control over patent enforcement.
States enacted statutes that regulate bad-faith assertions of patent
infringement, particularly demand letters.27 There are four characteristics of
24 See, e.g., Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Who
has legal title to a patent is a question of state law.”).
25 See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008), amended by
557 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Construction of patent assignment agreements is a matter of state
contract law.”).
26 Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1589-90 (footnotes omitted).
27 As of May 2019, 33 states have passed laws outlawing types of patent enforcement. Patent
Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, supra note 22.
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these emerging state anti-patent statutes: (1) a bond requirement, (2) a
private right of action, (3) protection of out-of-state recipients, and (4)
statutory prohibition against ﬁling a bad-faith patent-infringement lawsuit.28
Most states’ statutory schemes have several of these characteristics.29
Take Vermont, the anti-patent movement leader. Its scheme exhibits
three of the characteristics: a bond requirement, a private right of action,
and a statutory prohibition against filing a bad-faith patent-infringement
lawsuit.30 Under this scheme, Vermont uses a nonexhaustive multifactor
balancing test to determine whether a bad-faith assertion of patent
infringement exists.31 The statute provides several factors to consider as
evidence of a bad-faith assertion of patent infringement.32 For example, the
Vermont court considers whether the demand letter lacks the patent number,
the patentholder’s name and address, and “factual allegations concerning the
specific areas in which the target’s products, services, and technology
infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.”33 Another
factor is whether the patentholder, before sending the demand letter, “fails
to conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target’s
products, services, and technology, or such an analysis was done but does not
identify specific areas in which the products, services, and technology are
covered by the claims in the patent.”34
The statute also provides factors to determine whether an entity has made
a good-faith assertion of patent infringement, although most are just the
alternatives of the bad-faith factors.35 When a Vermont court ﬁnds that the
target of a demand letter established a “reasonable likelihood” that the
patentholder “made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement,” the court
will require the patentholder to “post a bond in an amount equal to a good
faith estimate of the target’s costs to litigate the claim and amounts reasonably
likely to be recovered.”36
In Vermont, the state Attorney General or a target can enforce the
statute.37 The potential private remedies consist of equitable relief, damages,

28 Matt Levy, More on State Patent Troll Laws, PATENT PROGRESS (Nov. 19, 2015),
http://www.patentprogress.org/2015/11/19/state-patent-troll-laws-video/ [https://perma.cc/7PYM-9PU8].
29 Id.
30 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4197–4199 (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.).
31 Id. § 4197.
32 Id. § 4197(b).
33 Id. § 4197(b)(1).
34 Id. § 4197(b)(2).
35 Id. § 4197(c); see infra Part V (analyzing Vermont’s statute under my suggested preemption
and petitioning-immunity tests).
36 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4198.
37 Id. § 4199.
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costs and fees, and either treble damages or $50,000, whichever is greater.38
Although Vermont has a geographical limitation for targets of demand letters,
other states, such as Colorado, don’t.39 Because federal courts have used
preemption and petitioning immunity to invalidate similar statutes, I turn to
Supreme Court precedent in those areas.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ON PREEMPTION AND PETITIONING
IMMUNITY
States know about preemption. The Vermont statute’s statement of
purpose, for example, notes that “Vermont is preempted from passing any law
that conﬂicts with federal patent law.”40 But are the states actually worried
about the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence?
In general, the federal patent laws’ preemption powers come from the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”41 There are two types of
preemption: express and implied.42 Unlike copyright law, the Patent Act lacks
an express preemption provision.43
Implied preemption itself has two subcategories, ﬁeld and conﬂict
preemption. The implied-preemption inquiry “is a question of congressional
intent.”44 The Supreme Court hasn’t used ﬁeld preemption to invalidate a
state statute with the federal patent laws as the ﬁeld, but two years ago the
Federal Circuit, for the ﬁrst time, did.45 The Supreme Court, though, has
invalidated state patent-related statutes using conﬂict preemption.46

Id. § 4199(b).
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-12-101 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“Intended
recipient means a person who purchases, rents, leases, or otherwise obtains a product or service in
the commercial market that is not for resale in the ordinary business and that is, or later becomes,
the subject of a patent infringement allegation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195(a)(3).
41 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause is a rule of priority.
42 Hrdy, supra note 12, at 190.
43 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (describing the copyright act’s “[p]reemption with respect to other
laws”); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law
to Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 335-36 (2008)
(comparing the two statutes).
44 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). The distinction between ﬁeld and
conﬂict preemption in state patent law is explored infra subsections II.A.1–2.
45 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
46 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154-57 (1989)
(finding a Florida statute prohibiting duplication of certain unpatented articles through direct
molding to be preempted).
38
39
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For conﬂict preemption in the intellectual-property context, two other
constitutional provisions also matter: the Intellectual Property Clause47 and
the Tenth Amendment.48 The IP Clause, in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8,
empowers Congress to promote the sciences by giving inventors exclusive
rights to their inventions for a limited time: “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”49
The IP Clause thus sets “the means and ends to which Congress can legislate
to protect intellectual property: Congress can act with the goal of promoting
progress of science and useful arts, using only the means set out therein, of
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to
their works.”50 The Tenth Amendment, because Congress only has
enumerated powers, presumably means that states have the power to regulate
intellectual property outside the means and ends set in the IP Clause: “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”51
A. Implied Preemption
1. Conﬂict Preemption
Conflict preemption “arises when compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”52
Although the Supreme Court hasn’t recently applied its conflict-preemption test
to anti-patent laws, the Supreme Court has tackled patent-like statutes.
In 1964, the Supreme Court, in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.53
and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiﬀel Co.,54 started patent law’s modern conﬂictpreemption jurisprudence. These two cases addressed the same issue:
whether the federal patent laws preempted state unfair-competition laws
protecting against the copying of unpatented industrial designs.55 In Compco,
the design was the subject of an invalidated design patent and was rejected
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id. amend. X.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Eﬀect, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 265, 265-66 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
51 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
52 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1983) (cleaned up).
53 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
54 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
55 Sears, 376 U.S. at 225; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38.
47
48
49
50
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for a utility patent.56 Similarly, in Sears, the design wasn’t entitled to a design
or to a utility patent.57 The Supreme Court preempted both statutes because
the state statutes pilfered the designs from the public domain, where the
designs “can be copied in every detail by whoever pleases.”58
Speciﬁcally, the Sears Court reasoned that state patent-like protection
impermissibly undermined the federal patent law’s novelty and
nonobviousness standards and its limited grant of exclusive rights:
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying
of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be
to permit the State to block oﬀ from the public something which federal law
has said belongs to the public. The result would be that while federal law
grants only [a limited number of years of] protection to genuine inventions,
States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty to
merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards. This would be
too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.59

But the Supreme Court was cautious when encroaching onto state powers.
Indeed, in dicta, the Sears Court signaled to states that the Court didn’t want
to undermine legitimate state interests in promoting fair trade: “Doubtless a
State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether
patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken
to prevent customers from being misled as to the source . . . .”60
Ten years later, the Supreme Court again considered conﬂict preemption
with the federal patent laws. This time, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the
Court held that state trade secret laws weren’t preempted by federal patent
law.61 Conﬂict preemption, the Court determined, must consider the
“purposes and objectives” of patent and trade secret law to determine whether
they “clash[].”62 The Court articulated three purposes of patent law: (1) to
provide an incentive for inventors; (2) to induce disclosure of inventions so
that the public warehouse of knowledge is improved; and (3) to ensure that
ideas in the public domain stay there.63
The Court then identiﬁed two main purposes of trade secret law: (1)
maintaining standards of commercial ethics and (2) encouraging invention.64
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

376 U.S. at 234-35.
376 U.S. at 231.
Compco, 376 U.S. 237-38; accord Sears, 376 U.S. at 226.
376 U.S. at 231-32 (cleaned up).
Id. at 232.
416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 481.
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The Court thought trade secret law might clash with only one purpose of
patent law: inducing disclosure of inventions.65 Without empirical evidence,
the Court relied on the laws’ diﬀerent purposes and trade secret law’s weaker
protection to conclude that there was “no reasonable risk of deterrence from
patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted
patents.”66 But the Court recognized that “[i]f a State, through a system of
protection, were to cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable
inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state
protection,” then the Court would preempt the statute.67
That Court examined three more things. First, the Court considered the
state’s interest in regulating business ethics.68 The Court found that state
eﬀorts to prevent industrial espionage by protecting trade secrets were
“unchallengeable” because that activity threatens the “fundamental human
right” of privacy.69 Second, the Court stated that the patent policy of
encouraging invention isn’t disturbed by an additional incentive to invent.70
Third, the Court considered history: namely, the fact that “trade secret law
and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one hundred years”
while Congress remained silent.71 To this Court, Congress’s silence meant
that trade secret law was important.72
Five years later, the Supreme Court tackled a state contract law giving
patent-like protection. In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., the Court held
that federal patent law didn’t preempt a state contract law that forced a
licensee “to pay royalties . . . on sales of articles embodying the [patent
applicant’s] invention, for so long as the contracting party sells them,” even if
a patent isn’t granted.73 The contract had a speciﬁc royalty rate that would
decrease by half if the patent wasn’t issued within ﬁve years.74 The law, the
Court concluded, didn’t conﬂict with the purposes of patent law identiﬁed in
Kewanee.75 As in Kewanee, the Court determined that the contract added
another incentive, which complemented patent law.76 And the Court again

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 484.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 493.
Id.
440 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1979).
Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 262-64.
Id.
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emphasized the state’s interest, acknowledging that “[c]ommercial
agreements traditionally are the domain of state law.”77
After another decade, the Supreme Court gave their last word on patent
conﬂict preemption in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.78 There, a
Florida statute prohibited selling a duplicate of an unpatentable boat hull.79
The machine in dispute was unpatentable because of the federal patent laws’
public-use bar.80 Conflict preemption, the Court reaffirmed, involved analyzing
the purposes and objectives of the statutes.81 Considering the Florida statute’s
structure, the Court said that the Florida statute’s purpose wasn’t to prohibit
unfair competition (concerned with protecting consumers from confusion by
source) but to induce “the improvement of boat hull designs.”82
Next, the Court analyzed the federal patent laws’ purposes. But this time
the Court explicitly addressed the IP Clause. As the Court saw it, the IP
Clause “reﬂects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the
avoidance of monopolies which stiﬂe competition without any concomitant
advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”83 The Court also noted
that the IP Clause is both a grant of power and a limit because “Congress may
not create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it authorize the
issuance of patents whose eﬀects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”84
To determine Congress’s eﬀectuated balance, the Court analyzed the
federal patent laws’ novelty and nonobviousness requirements. To this Court,
these statutorily enacted requirements show that “the purposes behind the
Patent Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of either
that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily
discerned from publicly available material.”85 So the Court concluded that
Florida’s patent-like statute undermined Congress’s eﬀectuated balance and
found troubling the “administrative problems” if states were allowed “to
create patent-like rights in various products in public circulation.”86
Besides the three purposes identiﬁed in Kewanee, the Court considered a
fourth possible purpose—national uniformity. After Kewanee and Aronson,
Id. at 262.
489 U.S. 141, 143 (1989).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 159 (excluding a person from receiving a patent when “the invention was . . . in public
use . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States”
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1952)).
81 Id. at 155.
82 Id. at 157-58.
83 Id. at 146 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
84 Id. (cleaned up).
85 Id. at 150.
86 Id. at 161.
77
78
79
80
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Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has
“exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals.”87 Congress’s goal was
“nationwide uniformity in patent law.”88 And like the Kewanee Court, the
Bonito Boats Court considered history: preemption is “particularly weak where
Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a ﬁeld of
federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and
to tolerate whatever tension there is between them.”89 History didn’t help the
Florida statute. The statute was preempted.90
2. Field Preemption
Under ﬁeld preemption, federal law invalidates state law when there’s a
“scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room to supplement it.”91 A scheme can be “so
pervasive” for two reasons: (1) “the federal interest is so dominant” that it
presumptively precludes any role for state law enforcement, or (2) “the object
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.”92 Field preemption is more
likely “when the federal statute deals with an area that the federal government
has traditionally controlled.”93 As described in Section III.B, the Supreme
Court hasn’t used ﬁeld preemption to invalidate a patent-related state statute,
but the Federal Circuit has.94
3. Presumption Against Preemption
In implied preemption, there’s “a reliable canon of interpretation” to
presume that a federal statute “supplement[s] rather than displace[s] state
law.”95 In conﬂict preemption, “if federal law neither prohibits nor requires
what state law forbids, state law prevails.”96 In ﬁeld preemption, when
Congress has legislated in a ﬁeld traditionally occupied by the states, the
court “start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 162 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981)).
Id. at 166-67 (cleaned up).
Id. at 168.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1983) (cleaned up).
92 Id. (cleaned up).
93 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 291 (2012).
94 See infra Section III.B.
95 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 93, at 290.
96 Id.
87
88
89
90
91
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and manifest purpose of Congress.”97 In patent-related conﬂict-preemption
analysis, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have rarely, if ever,
applied this canon of interpretation.
4. A Text-Centered Implied-Preemption Approach
Three members of the current Supreme Court—Justices Thomas,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—have grown skeptical of the implied-preemption
jurisprudence.98 As these justices recently put it, a litigant, for both ﬁeld and
conﬂict preemption, “must point speciﬁcally to a constitutional text or a
federal statute that does the displacing or conﬂicts with state law.”99 “So any
evidence of pre-emptive purpose, whether express or implied, must therefore
be sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue.”100 But congressional
intent for conﬂict preemption may be inferred if “a state law . . . makes
compliance with a federal statute impossible.”101
B. Petitioning Immunity: Noerr and Its Progeny
Some have argued that the real source of concern for these anti-patent
laws is the First Amendment’s Petition Clause.102 The First Amendment says,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”103
Petitioning immunity evolved in antitrust cases. In Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,104 a trucking company alleged
antitrust violations for an alleged “vicious, corrupt, and fraudulent” publicity
campaign by the railroad companies that “had attempted to inﬂuence
legislation.”105 It was alleged that the campaign “succeeded in persuading the
Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a measure known as the ‘Fair Truck Bill.’”106
The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act didn’t extend to actions that
“inﬂuence the passage or enforcement of laws”107—unless the campaign is a
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.). This recent trend began with
Justice Thomas. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
99 Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1901 (cleaned up).
100 Id. at 1907 (cleaned up); see Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“The Supremacy Clause . . . requires that pre-emptive eﬀect be given only to those federal
standards and policies that are set forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text that was
produced through the constitutionally required bicameral and presentment procedures.”).
101 Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1908.
102 See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 6.
103 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
104 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
105 Id. at 129-30.
106 Id. at 130.
107 Id. at 135.
97
98
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“mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”108
But the Court, a leading treatise says, didn’t actually apply the Petition
Clause. Rather, using a constitutional-avoidance-like analysis, the Court held
that “given the lack of any congressional mandate in the Sherman Act’s
legislative history to apply the statute to the political activity at issue, it would
not construe the statute so as to warrant such an application.”109 The First
Amendment concern existed because it’s important for individuals to inform
the government of their wants and because that information is valuable.110
Holding otherwise would “deprive the people of their right to petition in the
very instances in which that right may be of the most importance to them.”111
Noerr, however, left open four questions: First, does Noerr apply to judicial
and administrative proceedings? Second, how broad is the sham exception?
Third, does Noerr apply to non-antitrust claims? Last, does Noerr apply to
prelitigation activity?112 The next four subsubsections detail Supreme Court
precedent and scholarly discussion of these questions while the fifth
subsection discusses a patent-specific exception to petitioning immunity.
1. Judicial and Administrative Agencies
A decade later, the Supreme Court, in California Motor Transportation Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited,113 answered yes to the ﬁrst question. There, the Court
held that the same reasons for immunizing conduct trying to inﬂuence
legislative and executive eﬀorts demanded the same protection for access to
administrative agencies and courts.114 Later justices and scholars have
doubted this interpretation of the Petition Clause.115 For example, in Borough
of Duryea, Pennsylvania v. Guarnieri, Justices Thomas and Scalia, in
concurrence, doubted that a lawsuit is a constitutionally protected petition.116
Id. at 144.
1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 201b (4th ed. 2013).
110 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139.
111 Id.
112 The Supreme Court extended Noerr immunity to “[j]oint eﬀorts to inﬂuence public
oﬃcials.” United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
113 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
114 Id. at 510-11.
115 See, e.g., David Mcgowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism,
Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 397 (1994) (“If it is correct that
petitioning immunity can rest only in the First Amendment, then the grant of immunity . . . seems
too broad. When courts and regulatory agencies are at issue, the First Amendment has no
meaningful role to play . . . .”).
116 564 U.S. 379, 399, (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 403 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
108
109
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2. The Sham Exception
The Supreme Court has elaborated on the sham exception. That
exception has three relevant aspects: (1) the strength of the legal theory; (2)
factual misrepresentation; and (3) repetitive ﬁlings.
The Strength of the Legal Theory. The leading case on the sham exception is
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.
(PRE).117 There, the defendant alleged an antitrust violation because the
lawsuit’s only legal theory was frivolous.118 The Court held that there were
two requirements to pierce Noerr immunity: (1) the litigant’s actions were
objectively baseless and (2) the litigant had a subjective motivation “to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor, through the
use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—
as an anticompetitive weapon.”119
For the majority, Justice Thomas suggested that “probable cause,” from
the common-law tort of “malicious prosecution,” was the proper standard for
objective baselessness.120 In other words, a suit isn’t objectively baseless when
the plaintiﬀ has a “reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a] claim
may be held valid upon adjudication.”121 So the defendant must “disprove the
challenged lawsuit’s legal viability before the court will entertain evidence of
the suit’s economic viability.”122 Here the plaintiﬀ brought a copyrightinfringement claim under a legal theory that other circuits had split on.123
Because the lower circuits’ jurisprudence was unclear, the majority concluded
that the legal theory wasn’t objectively baseless.124
Justice Stevens, however, concurred only in the judgment.125 Justice
Stevens agreed that there must be an objective element but disagreed with
the majority’s narrow deﬁnition of objective baselessness.126 To Justice
Stevens, the objective component could be satisﬁed if the lawsuit were
“objectively unreasonable.”127 Unlike the majority, the objective prong could
still be satisﬁed when a plaintiﬀ brings a lawsuit with an insigniﬁcant chance
Prof ’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PRE), 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
Id. at 51-54.
Id. at 60-61 (cleaned up).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
Justice O’Connor joined this concurrence. Id. at 67 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Souter also concurred but only to comment on Justice Thomas’s probable-cause
language’s connection to tort law and to emphasize that the facts were undisputed. Id. at 66-67
(Souter, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 67-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
127 Id.
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
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of success on the merits.128 Instead, the Court, as Justice Stevens argued,
should be guided by the distinction between “abusing the judicial process to
restrain competition and prosecuting a lawsuit that, if successful, will restrain
competition.”129 A sham should therefore involve a “plaintiﬀ [who] is
indiﬀerent to the outcome of the litigation itself, but has nevertheless sought
to impose a collateral harm on the defendant by, for example, impairing his
credit, abusing the discovery process, or interfering with his access to
governmental agencies.”130 In essence, the concurrence disagreed with the
rigidness of the objective component.
Factual Misrepresentations. In dicta, the PRE majority stated several broad
conclusions that could implicate claims based on factual misrepresentations.131
Justice Thomas stated that Noerr protects “objectively reasonable effort[s] to
litigate”; that Noerr protects lawsuits “reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable
outcome”; and that a successful lawsuit is a reasonable petition.132
At least one scholar urges caution. Hovenkamp argues that this dicta
shouldn’t be read broadly but in the context that it was written.133 Specifically,
the dicta shouldn’t be applied “to a claim that may be successful but only
because the underlying factual allegations were false.”134 This follows the
Court’s footnote deferring the question of fraudulent factual claims: “We need
not decide here whether and, if so, to what extent Noerr permits the imposition
of antitrust liability for a litigant’s fraud or other misrepresentations.”135
Repetitive Claims. In California Motors, the Court hinted that a single
successful claim does not immunize repetitive lawsuits:
Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when
used in the adjudicatory process. Opponents before agencies or courts often
think poorly of the other’s tactics, motions, or defenses and may readily call
them baseless. One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may
go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which
leads the factﬁnder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes
have been abused.136

128 Id. at 68. Justice Stevens was concerned that Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992)—a case
with “10 years of litigation and two trips to the Court of Appeals to recover one dollar from one
defendant”—wouldn’t satisfy the majority’s objective component. Id. at 68 n.2 (cleaned up).
129 Id. at 68.
130 Id.
131 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205b.
132 PRE, 508 U.S. at 57, 60 & n.5.
133 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205b.
134 Id.
135 PRE, 508 U.S. at 61 n.6.
136 Ca. Motors Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 110, 513 (1972).
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There, the Court still held 40 claims baseless even though another 21 of
the claims were meritorious.137 The California Motors Court, as Hovenkamp
explains, seems to require that parties should consider the merits of each
petition individually.138
3. Non-Antitrust Claims
The Supreme Court hasn’t directly answered whether Noerr applies to
non-antitrust claims. Outside antitrust, the Supreme Court has struggled to
establish a distinct Petition Clause doctrine, often transplanting Free Speech
doctrine into their analysis. Paul Gugliuzza uses McDonald v. Smith139 and
Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania v. Guarnieri,140 two cases that intertwine with
Free Speech doctrine and involve non-antitrust claims, to question Noerr’s
application outside antitrust.141
In McDonald, the defendant wrote two letters to the president, with
allegedly libelous statements, to hinder the plaintiﬀ ’s “prospect of being
appointed United States Attorney.”142 The Court didn’t hold that Noerr
granted the defendant immunity because “there is no sound basis for granting
greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the
President than other First Amendment expressions.”143 This leads Gugliuzza
to conclude that McDonald suggests that “the Petition Clause allows state tort
law room to operate, so long as that state law does not condemn speech that
is protected by the [Free Speech Clause].”144 In short, states can regulate
patentholder statements if the statute isn’t preempted or doesn’t violate the
Free Speech Clause.
Noerr was also not applied to the union grievance in Guarnieri.145 In that
case, the plaintiﬀ ﬁled a “union grievance challenging his termination as chief
of police.”146 The arbitrator ordered the plaintiﬀ ’s reinstatement.147 Then the
defendants “issued 11 directives” instructing the plaintiﬀ on how to do his
job.148 The plaintiﬀ sued the borough arguing that the directives were
impermissible retaliation against his petition, the union grievance.149 The
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 204c.
Id.
472 U.S. 479 (1985).
564 U.S. at 382.
Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1612-16.
472 U.S. at 480-81.
Id. at 485.
Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1613-14.
564 U.S. at 383.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 384.
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Court refused to apply Noerr because “the Petition Clause is not an
instrument for public employees to circumvent these legislative enactments
[federal and state employment regulations] when pursuing claims based on
ordinary workplace grievances.”150 The Court then analogized to the Free
Speech Clause’s public-concern test and applied it to the plaintiﬀ ’s claims
under the Petition Clause.151 From this, Gugliuzza claims that “Noerr has
limited relevance outside of antitrust law.”152
Gugliuzza’s reasoning, respectfully, falls short. These Supreme Court
cases do not show that Noerr always has limited relevance outside antitrust
law. Rather, these cases show that the proper determination of the doctrinal
standard outside antitrust is an analysis of the competing interests between
the federal government, the state government, and the individual to
determine whether the statute infringes the Constitution.153
Both McDonald and Guarnieri involved interest balancing. In McDonald,
the Court balanced the interests underpinning the Free Speech Clause and
libel suits with an individual’s interest in petitioning the President about a
potential hire.154 And in Guarnieri, the majority assessed the administrability
of the standard and the concerns presented by employee grievances.155 Justice
Thomas’s concurrence in Guarnieri also called for a balance of competing
interests: “Even where a public employee petitions the government in its
capacity as sovereign, I would balance the employee’s right to petition the
sovereign against the government’s interest as an employer in the eﬀective
and eﬃcient management of its internal aﬀairs.”156 These opinions recognize
that it’s not the type of claim that changes the level of protection of
petitioning immunity but the balancing of competing interests.
That the Court should balance competing interests is also shown by the
Supreme Court’s treatment of attorney’s fee shifting in patent cases. In
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that Noerr immunity didn’t apply to a statute awarding attorney’s fees in
exceptional cases.157 The Court concluded this after balancing the purpose of
the Petition Clause, protecting access to the courts, the interest of Congress
in having fee shifting, and the burden of fee shifting on bringing lawsuits.
The Supreme Court wrote, “But to the extent that patent suits are similarly
Id. at 392.
Id. at 389-90.
Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1616.
See Robert A. Zauzmer, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-Antitrust
Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1243, 1253 (1984).
154 472 U.S. at 484-85.
155 564 U.S. 379, 398-99 (2011).
156 564 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
157 572 U.S. 545, 555-57 (2014).
150
151
152
153
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protected as acts of petitioning, it is not clear why the shifting of fees in an
‘exceptional’ case would diminish that right. The threat of antitrust liability (and
the attendant treble damages [in] 15 U.S.C. § 15),” the Court argued, “far more
significantly chills the exercise of the right to petition than does the mere
shifting of attorney’s fees.”158 “In the Noerr-Pennington context,” the Court
explained, “defendants seek immunity from a judicial declaration that their filing
of a lawsuit was actually unlawful; here, they seek immunity from a far less onerous
declaration that they should bear the costs of that lawsuit in exceptional cases.”159
The balance there called for less protection. As the Court held, the burden
of paying attorney’s fees in exceptional cases, one that “stands out from others
with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position
(considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated,” doesn’t violate the
Constitution.160 Most importantly, however, the Supreme Court didn’t close
the door to Noerr immunity’s application outside the antitrust context.
Although in McDonald, Guarnieri, and Octane Fitness the competing
interests warranted less protection than Noerr immunity, this doesn’t mean that
Noerr shouldn’t apply to anti-patent statutes when the relevant interests are
balanced. To be sure, Gugliuzza correctly observes that McDonald and Guarnieri
rejected applying Noerr immunity in a non-antitrust context. But Gugliuzza
lumps anti-patent statues in with those cases without properly analyzing
whether the Court, through a balancing of interests, should not apply Noerr’s
strong protection to the conduct burdened by anti-patent statutes.
4. Prelitigation Activity
The Supreme Court hasn’t addressed whether Noerr immunity applies to
prelitigation activity. But most circuits hold that functionally it should.161 And
Hovenkamp asserts that it’s counterintuitive and unproductive to not include
prelitigation activity under Noerr immunity.162 Others, however, adhere
literally to the text.163
Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
Id. at 545.
See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“[O]ur sister circuits, almost without exception, have applied the Noerr protections to
prelitigation communications.”).
162 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, at ¶ 205f.
163 See Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 RUTGERS
L. REV. 965, 1019 (2003) (“[A] communication that does not attempt to persuade a governmental
decision-maker to do something is not a petition . . . .”). Circuit courts have argued the same. See,
e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 891-92 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[S]tatements made in a letter threatening litigation are not absolutely protected by the petition
158
159
160
161
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But if the Petition Clause’s purpose is to protect access to the legal
decisionmaking process (including the courts), as I later argue, and
prelitigation communication is a fundamental step in that process, as I also
argue, then not extending the Petition Clause to those actions allows states
to undermine the purpose of the Petition Clause. And, as argued in Section
IV.B, the Constitution’s text does not foreclose its protection.
5. Walker Process Fraud: Patent-Speciﬁc Exception
to Petitioning Immunity
Besides the sham exception, the Supreme Court has explicitly found a
patent-speciﬁc exception to petition immunity. In Walker Process Equipment,
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., the Supreme Court held that when
a patentholder enforces a patent that was obtained by knowingly and willfully
misrepresenting facts to the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, the
patentholder isn’t immune to an antitrust claim.164 Like with the sham
exception, the antitrust elements must still be proven.165
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PREEMPTION, PETITIONING
IMMUNITY, AND PATENT ENFORCEMENT
Recall that preemption occurs through either express or implied
preemption. And recall that the Patent Act lacks an express preemption
provision.166 Again, implied preemption occurs in two ways: conﬂict and ﬁeld
preemption. Before late 2017, the Federal Circuit had never invalidated a
statute by ﬁeld preemption.167
This Part has three sections. Section A details the Federal Circuit’s
conﬂict-preemption jurisprudence. Then section B describes the Federal
Circuit’s only ﬁeld-preemption case. Last, section C discusses the federal
patent act’s policy on enforcement.
A. The Journey to a Conﬂict-Preemption Test Inﬂuenced by the Petition Clause
Since its creation, the Federal Circuit has restricted states’ ability to enact
anti-patent laws. The Federal Circuit, when facing patent-like laws, has
adhered to the analysis created by the Supreme Court in Kewanee, Aronson,
clause of the First Amendment and are subject to the principles of state common law and state
statutory law.”).
164 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965).
165 Id. Unlike Walker Process fraud, “a patentee’s activities in procuring the patent are not
necessarily at issue” when determining whether the sham exception applies. Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
166 Hrdy, supra note 12, at 190.
167 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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and Bonito Boats. But for anti-patent cases, the doctrine has shifted from
analyzing the purposes of the federal patent laws and of the state statute to
solely analyzing the conduct the statute covers.
Early on, the Federal Circuit preempted an anti-patent statute that gave
an additional remedy for conduct that federal patent law already had a remedy
for. In Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan, the Federal Circuit addressed “whether
the state tort action for abuse of process can be invoked as a remedy for
inequitable or other unsavory conduct of parties to proceedings in the Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce.”168 The court preempted the statute because an
additional state action “would be an inappropriate collateral intrusion on the
regulatory procedures of the PTO.”169
Seven years later, the Federal Circuit assessed another statute
implicating the inequitable-conduct defense. This time the statute survived.
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., the Federal Circuit addressed whether
federal patent laws preempted a state-law tort claim for intentional
interference with actual and prospective contractual relations that implicated
the inequitable-conduct defense.170 After concluding that “it [was] difficult
to fathom” that the tort obstructed the three purposes of federal patent law
identified in Kewanee, the court held that the federal patent laws didn’t
preempt the claim.171 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Dow court
recognized that “the protection of the integrity of commercial contracts” was
“traditionally . . . the domain of state law.”172 The majority distinguished this
state tort claim from the one in Abbott, as this claim required “elements
entirely different to those required for inequitable conduct before the PTO”
and allowed for a different remedy.173
The Federal Circuit, however, then departed from the Supreme Court
precedent of analyzing the purposes of the statutes and instead focused on
applying a bad-faith standard to a patentholder’s conduct. In Hunter Douglas,
Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., the Federal Circuit evaluated the defendant’s
“allegedly tortious conduct” to determine whether the state tort claim
provided a remedy for “conduct that is protected or governed by federal
patent law.”174 Using an as-applied analysis of the state unfair-competition
law, the court preempted the law because the “federal patent law bars the
imposition of liability for publicizing a patent in the marketplace unless the
plaintiﬀ can show that the patentholder acted in bad faith” and “requir[ing]
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

952 F.2d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1357.
139 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1475, 1478-79.
Id. at 1475 (cleaned up).
Id. at 1477-78.
153 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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less would impermissibly alter the balance between the competing purposes
of federal patent law.”175
This derailment continued. The Federal Circuit, in Zenith Electronics Corp. v.
Exzec, Inc., affirmed that bad faith was the proper conflict-preemption
analysis.176 Bad faith, the court said, is a case-by-case analysis and “a prerequisite
to [an alleged infringer’s] state-law tortious interference claim; without it, the
claim is preempted by patent law.”177 The court also gave a clear example of bad
faith: “[I]f the patentee knows that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed, yet represents to the marketplace that a competitor is infringing the
patent.”178 And the court noted that statements that are impossible to confirm
in advance, like whether you can design around a patent, are inherently suspect,
making the bad-faith standard easier to satisfy.179
Three years later, the Federal Circuit elaborated on actionable bad-faith
statements in Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc.180 Statements are actionable when
clear and convincing evidence exists that “the infringement allegations are
objectively false, and that the patentee made them in bad faith.”181 Bad faith
required the patentholder to allege infringement “with knowledge of their
incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either.”182
Finally, the Federal Circuit linked the bad-faith standard with Noerr
immunity in Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.183 In that
case, the court held that Noerr immunity applied to prelitigation
communications for two reasons.184 First, several sister circuits held so.185
Second, not extending the protection to prelitigation activity would be
anomalous and socially counterproductive.186 In other words, it’s odd that
someone would be protected if they “strike[] without warning” but not if they
give notice to the other party, opening the possibility to settlement.187 Thus,
“[t]he federal patent laws preempt state laws that impose tort liability for a
patentholder’s good faith conduct in communications asserting infringement
of its patent and warning about potential litigation,” unless the statute
satisﬁes the two-part test from PRE.188
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 1336-37.
182 F.3d 1340, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1354-55.
310 F.3d 1374, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1371.
Id.
362 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id. at 1376-77.
Id.; accord AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205f.
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (2004).
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From the development of conﬂict preemption for anti-patent laws, there
are three takeaways. One, the inquiry moved from a purpose-based analysis
of the patent act and the disputed statute to a conduct-based analysis. Two,
the First Amendment inﬂuenced the Federal Circuit’s doctrine. Three, the
current analysis is a rigid rule, which is typical of the Federal Circuit.189
B. Field Preemption
For the first time in late 2017, the Federal Circuit used field preemption to
invalidate a state unfair-competition law. In Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
(BPCIA) preempted the state-law claims because the BPCIA was a
“comprehensive, carefully calibrated scheme” that “left no room for the States
to supplement it.”190 The field-preemption-causing conflict, the Court argued,
was the different “available remedies between federal and state law.”191 The
field wasn’t patent law generally but specifically biosimilar patent litigation.192
Alternatively, the court concluded that there was also conflict preemption.193
C. Federal Patent Law’s Enforcement Policy
The Patent Act doesn’t provide damages or injunctive relief for
patentholder conduct, only invalidation or unenforceability.194 Surprisingly,
federal patent law hardly mentions enforcement. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) gives
patentholders the right to “give notice to the public that [their invention] is
patented.”195 An inventor gives notice by marking an article, by ﬁling for
infringement, or by other means like demand letters.196 Federal patent law
also gives several aﬃrmative defenses based on improper conduct by a patent
owner: misuse, inequitable conduct, and estoppel.197
In general, patent misuse occurs when a patentholder, through a license,
imposes conditions that exceed the scope of the patent right.198 When a court
189 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleﬂex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (overturning the Federal
Circuit’s rigid obviousness test because it conﬂicted with the Court’s previously established
“expansive and ﬂexible approach”).
190 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326-28 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
191 Id. at 1328.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1328-30.
194 Of course, patentholder conduct can lead to increased damages.
195 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2018).
196 Id.
197 See, e.g., id. § 282(b). Before 2017, laches was a defense for improper conduct, but the
Supreme Court held that laches couldn’t bar claims for damages under 35 U.S.C. § 286. SCA
Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC., 137 S. Ct. 954, 959 (2017).
198 Princo Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1326-31 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Patent law provides several patent-misuse exceptions. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).
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ﬁnds misuse, the court withholds the remedy for infringement or for breach
of a license agreement until the misuse stops.199
Inequitable conduct, by contrast, only involves conduct before the Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce. It requires both proof of a speciﬁc and deliberate
intent to deceive the PTO and materiality.200 For intent, the patentee must
know that the reference exists and is material and must deliberately withhold
the reference.201 For materiality, the Federal Circuit requires a high threshold
of but-for materiality: a reference is material if the PTO wouldn’t have
allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed reference.202 The
Federal Circuit, however, carved out an exception for particularly egregious
misconduct, such as ﬁling false aﬃdavits or aﬃrmative egregious acts.203
Last, equitable estoppel occurs “when (1) the patent owner through
conduct, positive statement, or misleading silence represents to the infringer
that his business will be unmolested by claims of infringement, and (2) in
reliance on that representation, the infringer continues or expands his
business.”204 In short, the federal patent law gives defendants limited actions
against patentholder conduct.
Considering these rights, the Federal Circuit declared a general policy
that patentholders’ good-faith enforcements were immune from liability. In
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the plaintiﬀ manufactured and sold to
hospitals a patented medical device.205 The device was labeled “Single Use
Only” and packaged with an insert stating that the medical device was “For
Single Patient Use Only” and that “the entire contaminated apparatus [must]
be disposed of in accordance with procedures for the disposal of biohazardous
waste.”206 Hospitals instead sold the used device to the defendant for
reconditioning and reuse.207 The Federal Circuit concluded that the plaintiﬀ
could send a notice to its customers that reuse was an infringement because
the patentholder acted in good faith.208
Indeed, “[a] patentee that has a good faith belief that its patents are being
infringed violates no protected right when it so notiﬁes infringers: Patents,”
wrote the Federal Circuit, “would be of little value if infringers of them could
not be notiﬁed of the consequences of infringement or proceeded against in

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

6A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2018).
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292.
6A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.05 (2018).
976 F.2d 700, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701, 709.
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the courts. Such action, considered by itself cannot be said to be illegal.”209
The court continued: “It is not an actionable wrong for one in good faith to
make plain to whomsoever that it is his purpose to insist upon what he
believes to be his legal rights, even though he may misconceive what those
rights are.”210 The Federal Circuit also gave three examples of punishable badfaith infringement notices: (1) making threats without intending to sue; (2)
sending notices indiscriminately to everyone in the trade; and (3) lacking a
good-faith belief in the validity of its patent.211 At least outside preemption
analysis, the Federal Circuit believed that patent policy required
immunization of good-faith enforcements.
IV. REASSESSING PREEMPTION & PETITION IMMUNITY
Section A describes three prior proposals for the proper intellectualproperty preemption analysis. None of these works suggest a framework for
petition immunity or a change to the sham exception: the proposals either
clarify the proper conﬂict-preemption analysis under precedent or argue that
Noerr shouldn’t apply to demand letters. Section B suggests a framework for
determining the level of protection under the Petition Clause and details the
proper analysis of the objective requirement for Noerr immunity.
A. Other Academic Proposals
There are three relevant proposals on intellectual-property preemption.
The ﬁrst clariﬁes Supreme Court intellectual-property preemption doctrine
and creates a framework. The other two address anti-patent laws and suggest
changes to the Federal Circuit’s preemption and petition-immunity analysis.
1. The IP Clause as a Guide
Jeanne Fromer persuasively argues that the IP Clause guides the
preemption analysis but doesn’t preempt state laws by its own force.212 As
Fromer asserts, state laws are preempted “on satisfaction of two conditions:
(1) they lie within the preemptive scope of the IP Clause, and (2) they upset
the IP Clause’s balance, as eﬀectuated by a federal law.”213
First, Fromer’s argument requires an important understanding of the IP
Clause and the structural purpose of the state law. In previous works, Fromer
argued that “the best understanding of the IP Clause is that it both grants
209
210
211
212
213

Id. at 709 (cleaned up).
Id. at 710.
Id.
Fromer, supra note 50, at 266.
Id.
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and limits Congress’s powers to enact intellectual-property protection.”214 As
she saw it, the purpose of the clause is “encouraging the advancement of
systematic knowledge, cultural knowledge, and technology.”215 The means
Congress may use is giving inventors exclusive rights to their inventions for
a limited time.216 When determining the state law’s purpose, Fromer suggests
ascertaining it from the law’s structure, not from empirics.217 But “state laws
that piggyback oﬀ the federal laws passed pursuant to the IP Clause lie within
its preemptive scope in certain ways, even if they lack structural purpose to
promote progress of science and useful arts.”218
Second, to determine whether the state law upsets the statutorily
implemented balance, the congressional intent of the particular balance
between inventors and public entitlements must be assessed.219 Then the
analysis “will typically require an assessment of the eﬀect on this balance by
the state law at issue both facially and as applied.”220
Fromer’s framework for Supreme Court precedent is correct. Because, for
intellectual property, Congress has only the power to promote the sciences
through a grant of exclusive rights for a limited time to an inventor, states,
through the Tenth Amendment, have powers to legislate in intellectual
property. The Supreme Court has even denied, several times, that states lack
a legitimate interest in regulating intellectual property.221
And a structural analysis of the state statutes is the most eﬀective
approach because it shields judges from debating empirics that aren’t likely
available during the litigation. It also gives states notice and predictability in
assessing the scope of the IP Clause and whether their statutes will be within
the IP Clause’s power. Last, Fromer captures the purpose of conﬂict
preemption in her test: even if the statutes are within Congress’s power, the
statute still must be a suﬃcient obstacle to federal patent law. Thus, Fromer’s
two-part framework correctly characterizes Supreme Court precedent and
should be applied to the state anti-patent laws.

214 Id. at 278 (citing Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61
DUKE L.J. 1329 (2012)).
215 Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, supra note 214, at 1373.
216 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
217 Fromer, supra note 50, at 279.
218 Id. at 266.
219 Id. at 284.
220 Id. at 286.
221 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989) (“States
may place limited regulations on the use of unpatented designs in order to prevent consumer
confusion as to source.”).
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2. Returning to Equitable Good Faith
As mentioned, Gugliuzza argues that petition immunity shouldn’t apply
to demand letters.222 Gugliuzza suggests that the Federal Circuit should bring
back the malleable good-faith standard rather than equating bad faith with
Noerr immunity.223 Traditionally, good faith was a “subjective concept: that
the speaker sincerely believed in the truth of his statement.”224 That test
therefore opens up the door for “private plaintiﬀs and government law
enforcers . . . to impose civil liability on unscrupulous patent holders without
having to take the diﬃcult additional step of disproving the merits of the
underlying infringement claim.”225
As discussed in Section II.B., Gugliuzza incorrectly analyzes whether the
Petition Clause can protect demand letters and what the level of protection
is. Although his ultimate suggestion—that one of Congress’s intents was to
protect good-faith enforcements—is correct, he only determines the
eﬀectuated balance by case law and not through the congressionally enacted
rights and aﬃrmative defenses in patent law.
3. The Dormant IP Clause
Most recently, Camilla Hrdy argues that the true origin of preemption is
the IP Clause itself and recommends a reasonableness test.226 Hrdy suggests
returning to the rule in Allen v. Riley,227 where courts “assess whether a
particular state law unconstitutionally burdens the patent right itself as
‘secured’ by Congress based on the preemptive eﬀect of the Intellectual
Property Clause itself.”228 The question is “what does it mean for a state to
place an ‘unreasonable’ versus a ‘reasonable’ burden on a federal patent right?”229
To this, she gives two possibilities: (1) a clear ceiling or (2) a
reasonableness test.230 But Hrdy’s proposed interpretation of the IP Clause
lacks textual standing.231 Like the Dormant Commerce Clause, the IP Clause
is only a positive grant. But the excuse the Supreme Court uses to justify the
Dormant Commerce Clause doesn’t apply to the IP Clause. As the Supreme
Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1643-44.
Id.
Id. at 1618 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1643-44.
Hrdy, supra note 12, at 140-41.
203 U.S. 347 (1906).
Hrdy, supra note 12, at 202.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Cf. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 571-72 (arguing that the Dormant Commerce
Clause is absent from the text or structure of the Constitution and is therefore illegitimate).
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
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Court sees it, the fact that “the Commerce Clause by its own force restricts
state protectionism is deeply rooted in our case law. And without the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause, we would be left with a constitutional scheme
that those who framed and ratiﬁed the Constitution would surely ﬁnd
surprising.”232 The IP Clause, by contrast, lacks the history and established
case law to warrant inferring a negative aspect. Hrdy also doesn’t credit
Kewanee and Bonito Boats overruling the early case law.233
B. Reevaluating Noerr’s Application to Courts and Prelitigation Activity
1. The Petition Clause’s Scope
The Petition Clause Applies to Courts. A proper determination of the
Petition Clause’s original public meaning requires a textual and historical
analysis. Let’s start with the text.234 The First Amendment says, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”235 There are three key
deﬁnitions from founding-era dictionaries:
•
•

•

Petition: “To make a request to; to ask from; to solicit; . . . to
petition a court of chancery.”236
Redress: “To remedy; to repair; to relieve from, and sometimes
to indemnify for; as, to redress wrongs; to redress injuries;
to redress grievances. Sovereigns are bound to protect their
subjects, and redress their grievances.”237
Grievance: “That which causes grief or uneasiness; that which
burdens, oppresses or injures, implying a sense of wrong done, or
a continued injury, and therefore applied only to the eﬀects of
human conduct; never to providential evils. The oppressed
subject has the right to petition for a redress of grievances.”238

Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2460 (2019).
Hrdy glosses over the argument in a footnote asserting that those cases apply only to
patent-like statutes, as distinct from anti-patent statutes. Hrdy, supra note 12, at 139 n.20.
234 For discussions on why original public meaning is the lodestar of constitutional analysis,
see NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 108-27 (2019); SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 93, at 78-92; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-85 (1990).
235 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
236 Petition, 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(New York, S. Converse 1828) (emphasis added); see Petition, 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan 1773) (“to solicit; to supplicate”).
237 Redress, WEBSTER, supra note 236.
238 Grievance, WEBSTER, supra note 236.
232
233
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Put together, this contemporary textual evidence reveals that the Petition
Clause protects citizens’ requests to the government (including courts) to
remedy their problems.239
The text reveals something else: “[t]he reference to ‘the right of the people’
indicates that the Petition Clause was intended to codify a pre-existing
individual right, which means that we must look to historical practice to
determine its scope.”240 Maggie Blackhawk, in analyzing petitioning from the
colonists to the Constitutional Convention, concludes that petitioning was “an
intrinsic part of English political life” and was the “primary means of political
engagement for the unenfranchised and for collective political activity.”241
The public’s understanding of the Petition Clause before and after
ratiﬁcation conﬁrms this.242 Based on a review of 600 petitions to the First
Congress, Blackhawk determines that Congress plainly “aﬀord[ed] equal,
formal, and public process to petitioners.”243 Petitions involved mostly private
concerns but also public concerns, such as requests for patent protection and
pensions and commentary on slavery.244 Notably, Congress often “referred
these petitions to the executive or to a congressional committee for review
and routinely provided each a formal response.”245 Although Blackhawk
239 For a discussion of some shortcomings of Founding-era dictionaries, see Thomas R. Lee &
James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 283-89 (2019).
240 Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 403 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241 Maggie Blackhawk, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1144-56 (2016).
Blackhawk also discusses legislative history. She contextualizes the First Amendment’s text by analyzing
the “most substantive discussion of the right to petition[,] . . . an effort to amend what would become
the First Amendment to include a more restrictive right—the right to instruct representatives.” Id. at
1147. By rejecting the amendment, the Founders concluded that “petitioning . . . ought to form the
limiting principle on how the public could engage in the lawmaking process outside of the vote, in order
to maintain republican principles and those mechanisms of representation carefully designed and
detailed elsewhere in the Constitution.” Id. at 1152.
But “[t]he private intent behind a drafter’s rejection of one version of a text is shoddy evidence
of the public meaning of an altogether diﬀerent text.” Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1965
(2019); see United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (“[F]ailed legislative proposals are a
particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute . . . .” (cleaned
up)). “Congressional inaction,” the Supreme Court says, “lacks persuasive signiﬁcance because
several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the
existing legislation already incorporated the oﬀered change.” Craft, 535 U.S. at 287 (cleaned up). But
see Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 521 (2001) (“The fact that the proposal was made suggests that its
proponents thought it necessary, and the fact that it was rejected by a vote of 41 to 10 suggests that
we should give weight to the views of those who opposed the proposal.” (cleaned up)).
242 The Supreme Court seems split on the weight of post-enactment history. Recently, Justice
Alito described the post-enactment history in Heller as only being “treated as mere conﬁrmation of
what the Court thought had already been established.” Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1976. Justice Scalia in
Heller, by contrast, categorized post-enactment history as “a critical tool of constitutional
interpretation.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008).
243 Blackhawk, supra note 241, at 1152.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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concludes that the “historical right concerned direct engagement with
government only” and that advocacy outside formal channels isn’t protected
by the Petition Clause but the Free Speech Clause, her ﬁndings help evaluate
the competing interests in determining whether the Petition Clause applies
to these anti-patent statutes.246
Besides the founding-era dictionaries, history bolsters the claim that the
Petition Clause should apply to agencies and courts. In analyzing the
outgrowth of the administrative state, Blackhawk points out that “the petition
process resembled litigation in a court more closely than the rough and
tumble public engagement process described by political scientists today.
Petitioners would submit formal documents, like complaints, to trigger
petition actions in Congress.”247 By tracking the creation of the administrative
state from Congress’s perspective, Blackhawk shows that Congress
transferred jurisdiction over certain petitions when Congress created
commissions and the Court of Claims.248 In short, the Petition Clause,
according to Blackhawk, protects a right to equal, formal, and public access
to the lawmaking process.249
I, by contrast, read the history as assuring the right to petition the
government’s legal decisionmaking process (includes the lawmaking process).250
This reading wouldn’t narrow the scope to the legislative or executive
functions. Rather, to me, the history and ordinary meaning of petition, redress,
and grievance support a broader protection, including asking for rights to be
adjudicated. After all, “[i]t is a settled and invariable principle . . . that every
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress.”251 And the court, according to Chief Justice Marshall, has a role in
providing redresses.252 It would therefore be passing strange for the
enactment and enforcement of a law to be protected but not the action that

Id. at 1185-86.
Maggie Blackhawk, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J.
1538, 1547 (2018).
248 Id. at 1548-49.
249 Id. at 1550.
250 Perhaps we eﬀectively mean the same thing but disagree on what’s included in the
“lawmaking process.”
251 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (emphasis added) (quoting 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109).
252 Id.
246
247
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gives the law its “legal eﬀect.”253 And courts do just that, especially when there
are indeterminacies.254
But even if you believe that the court makes law,255 then you still will find
under Blackhawk’s formulation that the Petition Clause’s scope will include
courts. If the court makes law, then it is no doubt part of the lawmaking process.
The Petition Clause Applies to Prelitigation Activity. Where Blackhawk and I
most fundamentally diﬀer is whether the Petition Clause only applies to direct
interaction with the government. Under Blackhawk’s conception of the
Petition Clause, prelitigation activity or public campaigns like in Noerr
wouldn’t be protected by the Petition Clause but by the Free Speech Clause.256
Courts and scholars have suggested that the First Amendment’s text is an
insurmountable hurdle to petition immunity applying to prelitigation

253 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1985 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “the
power of a court to give legal effect to prior judicial decisions” (quoting Gary Lawson, The Constitutional
Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 30 (1994))). See generally Lawrence B. Solum,
Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (2013) (distinguishing between
communicative content and legal content and concluding that courts give the text legal effect).
254 Human language, of course, isn’t “fully unequivocal in every context.” Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at
1986. As a result, “[w]ritten laws have a range of indeterminacy, and reasonable people may therefore
arrive at different conclusions about the original meaning of a legal text after employing all relevant tools
of interpretation.” Id. (cleaned up). Some scholars call this area of disagreement the construction zone.
See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 72 (2011)
(discussing the construction zone and how originalists should handle it).
And when faced with indeterminacies, the court’s role is to liquidate—“to make clear or plain’;
‘to render unambiguous; to settle (diﬀerences, disputes).” Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1982 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (cleaned up); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (“All new laws . . . are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”
(emphasis added)); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12 (“[T]o
‘liquidate’ the meaning of a term is to ‘clarify’ or ‘settle’ it.”).
255 Judge Pryor’s and Judge Rosenbaum’s recent clash illustrates the doctrine–law dispute.
Lester v. United States, 921 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2019). Here’s a taste:

•

•

Judge Pryor: “[W]e should be mindful of the difference between a change in judicial doctrine
and a change in law. . . . Although Booker radically changed judicial doctrine with respect
to the Guidelines, neither of its holdings was the equivalent of a legislative or constitutional
amendment to the substance of the law.” Id. at 1312-14 (Pryor, J.) (emphasis omitted).
Judge Rosenbaum: “So while we can pretend that the Supreme Court’s decisions do not
‘change the law,’ the reality is that in our constitutional system, sometimes they can and
they do.” Id. at 1333 (Rosenbaum, J.) (internal citations and alterations omitted).

See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527 (2019).
And more recently, Judge Haynes clashed with Judges Oldham and Ho on whether federal
courts make law. Compare Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 591-95 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
(Haynes, J.) (severing and removing an unconstitutional provision from a statute), with id. at 60811 (Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that courts lack the
power to make, change, or strike down a statute).
256 Blackhawk, supra note 241, at 1185-86.
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activity.257 But the text of the Petition Clause does not foreclose protecting
prelitigation activity. To start, “we must never forget, that it is a constitution
we are expounding.”258 The goal is a fair reading, not hyperliteralism.259 That
is why the Second Amendment, surely, protects manufacturing and selling
ﬁrearms, despite the text only speaking to “keep[ing] and bear[ing] arms.”260
True, these might not be considered the core of the right, but that doesn’t
mean they receive no protection, just less protection.261 The same should hold
true under the Petition Clause for prelitigation activity, as “the right to settle
generally accompanies the right to litigate in the ﬁrst place.”262 Otherwise,
states or Congress may heavily regulate indirect activity, stymying direct
interaction with the courts.
In short, I think the key question is how much protection the Petition
Clause should give to prelitigation activity—not whether it’s protected at all.
As I discussed in Subsection II.A.3, I propose a competing-interests analysis,
balancing the interests of petitioning the courts, free speech, state governments,
and the federal government, to determine the level of protection.
2. How Much Protection: Competing-Interests Analysis
To determine the proper level of regulation allowed under the Constitution,
the competing interests should be balanced. Here the ultimate doctrinal
limitation, however, should promote the purpose of the Petition Clause: access
to the legal decisionmaking process. The current state anti-patent statutes
implicate four interests: (1) access to courts; (2) compelled speech; (3) the state
and federal governments’ legitimate interest in protecting businesses and
promoting invention; and (4) the individual’s interest in decisionmaking not
based on false information. The first two interests outweigh the burdens on the
last two, so demand letters should have heightened protection.
First, access to courts. Prelitigation communication helps people access
the courts. Demand letters “provide useful notice and facilitate the resolution
of controversies.”263 Often, these demand letters result in settlements,
See supra note 163.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); see Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1982
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[J]udicial discretion is not the power to ‘alter’ the law; it is the duty to
correctly ‘expound’ it.”).
259 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 93, at 39-40.
260 See David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms Commerce?, 127 HARV. L.
REV. F. 230, 230 (2014); see also Josh Blackman, The 1st Amendment, 2nd Amendment, and 3D Printed
Guns, 81 TENN. L. REV. 479, 491-98 (2014).
261 This is the case in the scrutiny context. Ass’n of N.J. Riﬂe & Pistol Clubs v. Att’y Gen.
N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 126 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J., dissenting) (“[W]e pick a tier of scrutiny based only
on whether the law impairs the core right.”).
262 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 169 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
263 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205f.
257
258
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allowing the “legal system to develop . . . public and private structures that
allow for the relatively eﬃcient and eﬀective compensation of those harmed
in mass society.”264 These virtuous functions will be curtailed if the
government could punish an inherent ﬁrst step in patent-infringement
lawsuits but not if the patentholder sued ﬁrst. Indeed, in the words of Chief
Justice Roberts, “the right to settle generally accompanies the right to litigate
in the ﬁrst place.”265 And punishing the attempt to settle before litigation
would provide little incentive to do it.266 So a standard only protecting direct
interaction with the government hurts the Petition Clause’s purpose—access
to the courts—because litigation costs will increase and because dockets won’t
be streamlined. Importantly, most states, like Vermont, allow treble damages
to be awarded.267 The Supreme Court in Octane Fitness found the potential
for treble damages from antitrust a strong reason for Noerr immunity.268 So
at least with some anti-patent statutes, the burden on petitioning is high.
Second, compelled speech. Regulating prelitigation communication can
cause compelled speech. This strongly implicates free-speech principles, where
protection is great. Protection of “the First Amendment against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
all.”269 Although outside the scope of this Comment, there’s good reason to
believe that the compelled-speech doctrine will apply to demand letters.270
Third, state and federal government’s legitimate interest. States and the
federal government have an interest in protecting businesses, but the states
and federal government can still use procedure in litigation to deter this
behavior. Some scholars have suggested anti-SLAPP methods and fee shifting
to deal with bad-faith lawsuits.271 As seen in Octane Fitness, the competing

264 Samuel Issacharoﬀ & Robert H. Klonoﬀ, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1177, 1201-02 (2009).
265 Actavis, 570 U.S. at 169 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
266 See id. at 170 (arguing that opening settlements to antitrust liability provides no incentive to settle).
267 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4199(b)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.).
268 572 U.S. 545, 555-57 (2014).
269 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) (“There is certainly some diﬀerence between compelled
speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the diﬀerence is without
constitutional signiﬁcance, for the First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term
necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.”).
270 See Adam Mossoff, Demand Letters and Mandatory Disclosures: First Amendment Concerns,
ANTONIN SCALIA SCH. OF LAW (Apr. 29, 2014), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2014/04/29/demand-lettersand-mandatory-disclosures-first-amendment-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/8RAN-FPRB] (discussing
the implications of the compelled-speech doctrine for regulating demand letters).
271 See generally Rebecca Schoﬀ Curtin, Slapping Patent Trolls: What Anti-Trolling Legislation Can
Learn from the Anti-SLAPP Movement, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39 (2014).
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interests change once the parties are in litigation, letting the government
regulate the activity more.272
Last, decisionmaking on false information. An individual’s interest in
deciding whether to get a license based on accurate information isn’t greatly
hindered by protecting demand letters. As Hovenkamp argues, making false
material statements can lead to piercing Noerr immunity.273 Thus, states can
regulate when the false information is material, so the worst offenses are
punishable under the Petition Clause.274 To be sure, the current formulation of
the sham exception creates a near absolute immunity for demand letters. But
next, I describe a solution that will properly balance the competing interests
within the two-part test from PRE. In sum, petitioning is best protected by
strong, but not near absolute, protection of demand letters.
3. Reevaluating the Noerr Doctrine’s Objective-Baselessness Prong
PRE created a rigid rule for the objective-baselessness requirement: “no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”275 As Justice
Stevens noted, this rule isn’t workable for complex cases.276 Patent troll
demand-letter practices are just this complex situation that the current rule
doesn’t work for. So I propose that the Court adopts Justice Stevens’s flexible
standard that considers more than the merits of the single claim before the
Court. This will give states more room to regulate a legitimate state interest in
protecting businesses from bad-faith assertions of patent infringement while
still promoting the purpose of the Petition Clause.
Justice Stevens’s sham test focuses on a “plaintiﬀ [who] is indiﬀerent to
the outcome of the litigation itself, but has nevertheless sought to impose a
collateral harm on the defendant by, for example, impairing his credit,
abusing the discovery process, or interfering with his access to governmental
agencies.”277 Judge Posner, in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,278
captures the ﬂexible standard for objective baselessness. Judge Posner
suggests considering the probability of winning, the remedy, and the cost of
litigation.279 He also gave examples of objectively unreasonable suits:
Suppose a monopolist brought a tort action against its single, tiny competitor;
the action had a colorable basis in law; but in fact the monopolist would never
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279

572 U.S. at 557-58.
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205c2.
Of course, this depends on whether the statutes survive conﬂict preemption.
Prof ’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PRE), 508 U.S 49, 60 (1993).
Id. at 68 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), disapproved of by PRE, 508 U.S. at 65-66.
Id. at 472.
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have brought the suit—its chances of winning, or the damages it could hope
to get if it did win, were too small compared to what it would have to spend
on the litigation—except that it wanted to use pretrial discovery to discover
its competitor’s trade secrets; or hoped that the competitor would be required
to make public disclosure of its potential liability in the suit and that this
disclosure would increase the interest rate that the competitor had to pay for
bank financing; or just wanted to impose heavy legal costs on the competitor
in the hope of deterring entry by other firms.280

Thus, immunity is pierced “when [the party’s] purpose is not to win a
favorable judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and deter others,
by the process itself—regardless of outcome—of litigating.”281 Notably, the
outcome can change because the parties are competitors: “[t]he irrationality
of pursuing a given claim against a noncompetitor need not transform the
same claim against a competitor into a sham, even under the position of the
concurring opinion.”282 Although this analysis—ﬁnding the true purpose of
the litigation—is diﬃcult, courts already have to do this in other areas of
law.283 This ﬂexible approach will let states enact statutes directed at bottomfeeder and patent-aggregator trolls while preserving access to the legal
decisionmaking process.
V. STYLIZED EXAMPLE: VERMONT’S PATENT-ENFORCEMENT STATUTE
For states to combat bad practices of patent trolls, their well-intentioned
anti-patent statutes must survive conﬂict preemption, ﬁeld preemption, and
petition immunity. The three analyses are separate, as the focus of conﬂict
and ﬁeld preemption is the federal patent laws while petition immunity’s
source is the First Amendment incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Part has three sections. Section A recounts the story of MPHJ
Technology Investments, an infamous bottom-feeder patent troll.284 Section
B uses Fromer’s proper understanding of the Supreme Court’s conﬂictpreemption doctrine to see whether, both facially and as-applied to MPHJ,
the Vermont anti-patent statute survives conﬂict preemption. That section
also determines whether the statute survives ﬁeld preemption. Finally,
Section C applies my suggested petition-immunity test to MPHJ’s conduct
to see whether the Petition Clause immunizes MPHJ.

Id.
Id.
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205b.
Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 472.
See Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 763 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014); State v.
MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 282-5-13, 2014 WL 5795264, at *2 (Vt. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2014).
280
281
282
283
284
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Recall that Vermont uses a nonexhaustive multifactor balancing test to
determine whether there’s a bad-faith assertion of patent infringement.285
The statute provides several factors to consider as evidence of bad-faith
assertions of patent infringement:
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

The demand letter lacks the patent number, the patentholder’s
name and address, and “factual allegations concerning the speciﬁc
areas in which the target’s products, services, and technology
infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.”286
Before sending the demand letter, the patentholder “fails to
conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the
target’s products, services, and technology, or such an analysis was
done but does not identify specific areas in which the products,
services, and technology are covered by the claims in the patent.”287
The demand letter lacks the above information, the receiver of
the letter requests the missing information, and “the person fails
to provide the information within a reasonable period of time.”288
“The demand letter demands payment of a license fee or response
within an unreasonably short period of time.”289
The patentholder “offers to license the patent for an amount that
is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.”290
“The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and
the person knew, or should have known, that the claim or
assertion is meritless.”291
“The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.”292
The patentholder or “its subsidiaries or aﬃliates have previously
ﬁled or threatened to ﬁle one or more lawsuits based on the same
or similar claim of patent infringement” and they lacked
information above or in court were found to be meritless.293

The statute also provides factors in considering whether a person hasn’t
made a bad-faith assertion of patent infringement, although most are just the
alternatives of the bad-faith factors.294 In short, Vermont instructs courts to
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.).
Id. § 4197(b)(1).
Id. § 4197(b)(2).
Id. § 4197(b)(3).
Id. § 4197(b)(4).
Id. § 4197(b)(5).
Id. § 4197(b)(6).
Id. § 4197(b)(7).
Id. § 4197(b)(8).
Id. § 4197(c).
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consider objective and subjective factors, but it doesn’t require both for bad
faith. The Vermont Attorney General or a target of a demand letter can enforce
the statute.295 The potential private remedies consist of equitable relief,
damages, costs and fees, and treble damages or $50,000, whichever is greater.296
A. Bottom-Feeder Patent Troll: MPHJ Technology Investments
In September 2012, MPHJ bought from another NPE four U.S. patents
and one pending U.S. patent application, which later issued in 2013.297 Soon
after, MPHJ, through 81 of its subsidiaries, sent thousands of demand letters
to thousands of small businesses throughout the United States.298 MPHJ
targeted small businesses.299 In less than a year, MPHJ sent 16,465 letters.300
MPHJ did this in three stages.301
The ﬁrst demand letter alleged that the small business could be “using the
patented technology” and expressed that the letter was meant to “initiate
discussions regarding [the small business’s] need for a license.”302 Next, the
letter listed the four patents and the patent application.303 The letter then
shallowly analyzed the patents’ claims, asserting that the claims had a broad
scope.304 MPHJ also gave a nonexhaustive list of examples of alleged
infringing systems, and MPHJ asserted patent infringement because the
small business “almost certainly uses in its day-to-day operations digital
copier/scanner/multifunction equipment which is interfaced to a separate
central oﬃce computer (an oﬃce network), so that digital images may be
scanned and transmitted to one or more destinations such as email accounts
and other applications.”305 If this was the case, then the target “should enter
into a license agreement with [MPHJ].”306 The letter also suggested a “fair price”
of $1200 per employee.307 MPHJ gave the targets two weeks to respond.308

Id. § 4199.
Id. § 4199(b).
Complaint ¶ 6, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 142 3003 (F.T.C. Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150317mphjtechcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCF5-ZFQ4].
298 Id. ¶¶ 7, 14.
299 Id. ¶ 13.
300 Id. ¶ 17.
301 Id. ¶ 12.
302 Exhibit A at 1, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 142 3003 (F.T.C. Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/150317mphjtechexhibitsa-c.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKE5-RHUA].
303 Id.
304 See id. at 2.
305 Id. at 3-4.
306 Id. at 4.
307 Id. at 4. Some letters suggested a price of $1000 per employee. Complaint, supra note 297, ¶ 30.
308 Exhibit A, supra note 302, at 5.
295
296
297
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In the second stage, MPHJ sent demand letters referencing the ﬁrst letter
to over 10,000 small businesses.309 Each letter, sent on law-ﬁrm letterhead,
said that MPHJ “reasonably assumes you have an infringing system and need
a license” because there wasn’t a response to the ﬁrst letter.310 The letter also
stated that although there can be litigation, MPHJ’s preference was to “make
all reasonable eﬀorts to reach agreement on a license.”311 Again, the small
business was given two weeks to respond.312
In the last stage, the third letter referenced the ﬁrst two letters and stated
that if the small business didn’t respond in two weeks, then it would be sued
for patent infringement.313 The letter included a complaint.314 MPHJ sent the
letter to over 4,800 small businesses.315 At that point, according to the FTC,
MPHJ was “not prepared to initiate legal actions for infringement . . . against
the small businesses that did not respond . . . and did not intend to promptly
initiate such litigation.”316 Eventually, MPHJ ﬁled some lawsuits but against
large corporations, not the small businesses they targeted with the letters.317
B. Implied Preemption
1. Conflict Preemption
According to Fromer, federal patent law preempts the Vermont antipatent statute “on satisfaction of two conditions”: (1) the statute “lie[s]
within the preemptive scope of the IP Clause,” and (2) the statute “upset[s]
the IP Clause’s balance, as effectuated by a federal law.”318
First, to determine whether the Vermont statute is within the IP
Clause’s preemptive scope, the structural purpose of Vermont’s statute must
be determined. This must be done by looking “both at its facial purpose and

Complaint, supra note 297, ¶¶ 19, 21.
Id. ¶ 19.
Exhibit B, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 142 3003 (F.T.C. Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150317mphjtechexhibitsa-c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WKE5-RHUA].
312 Id.
313 Exhibit C, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 142 3003 (F.T.C. Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/documents/cases/150317mphjtechexhibitsa-c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WKE5-RHUA].
314 Id.
315 Complaint, supra note 297, ¶ 26.
316 Id. ¶ 38.
317 Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1582 n.17. Although MPHJ’s behavior was egregious, only 17
businesses bought licenses. Exhibit F ¶ 28, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. F.T.C., No. 14-cv-11 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 13, 2014), http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/FTC-MPHJ.draf_.complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89L8-UA5R].
318 Fromer, supra note 50, at 266.
309
310
311
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its purpose as applied in the particular enforcement scenario.”319 According
to the legislative findings and statement of purpose of Vermont’s antipatent statute, the statute’s purpose is “to build an entrepreneurial and
knowledge-based economy,” and attract small- and medium-size
companies.320 Vermont seeks to help businesses reduce the costs of resolving
litigation, so that the funds are available to “invest, produce new products,
expand, or hire new workers.”321
Facially, this is within the IP Clause’s preemptive scope. Like the IP
Clause, Vermont wants to encourage the advancement of knowledge and
technology except with a different means—reducing the funds lost from
litigation, so that companies can spend it on innovation, among other
things. Even as applied to a claim from the Attorney General or a private
party, the statute is within the IP Clause’s preemptive scope.322 For a
claim by the Attorney General, the statute would have deterred MPHJ
from continuing to send demand letters in bad faith, preventing smalland medium-sized businesses from losing money that would be spent on
research and development. And for a target claim, damages return R&D
money to the targeted business and serves the same function as a public
suit by the Attorney General. Thus, the Vermont anti-patent statute
scheme satisfies the first condition for conflict preemption both facially
and as applied to MPHJ.
Second, Congress’s effectuated balance must be determined. The
“dominant premise underlying American patent and copyright laws is that
the incentive of exclusive rights is granted to creators for a limited time to
encourage their productions, which are valuable to society.”323 The IP
Clause “reflects a balance between granting creators rights to create (and
disseminate) works that are valuable to the public to consume and build on,
but restricting them so that the public is not hurt.”324 Because congressional
intent is important here,325 the statute giving a patentholder the right to
provide notice, the affirmative defenses, Walker Process fraud, and the four
factors from Bonito Boats are helpful for this analysis.
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) gives patentholders the right to “give notice to the
public that [their invention] is patented.”326 This can be done by marking
Id. at 280-81.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.).
Id. § 4195(a)(4)–(7).
See id. § 4199(a)–(b) (authorizing either the Vermont Attorney General or the target of a
letter to sue).
323 Fromer, supra note 50, at 268.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 284; see APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE LAW OF
PREEMPTION 14-15 (1991) (discussing the importance of congressional intent in preemption analysis).
326 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2018).
319
320
321
322
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an article, by filing for infringement, or by other means like demand
letters.327 Federal patent law also provides several affirmative defenses
based on improper conduct by a patent owner: misuse, inequitable conduct,
and estoppel.328 Each affirmative defense has a high standard; several
require but-for materiality and specific intent. And unlike the Vermont
statute, which provides equitable relief and damages, federal patent law only
provides invalidity or unenforceability as a remedy. Congress’s effectuated
balance, at least with enforcement, could be viewed as showing a policy that
patentholder shouldn’t be punished for good-faith enforcement because the
federal patent laws only punish patentholders for extremely bad-faith
behavior. Federal patent law also appears to view the heavy punishment
under the affirmative defenses, along with Walker Process fraud, as enough
deterrence of bad behavior. A malleable bad-faith standard in the Vermont
statute wouldn’t conflict with the federal patent laws’ objective to protect
good-faith assertions of patent infringement.
But Vermont’s anti-patent statute does potentially conflict with three of
the four factors from Bonito Boats: to provide an incentive to inventors, to
induce disclosure of inventions, and to unify patent law.329
Incentive to Invent. The Vermont statute doesn’t provide patent-like
protection, but it still can incentivize inventors. By protecting potential
inventors from unnecessary expenses, the inventors can spend it on R&D,
potentially creating patentable inventions. Yet the Vermont statute perhaps
hampers the federal patent laws’ incentive to invent. Although the financial
burdens in satisfying the Vermont statute don’t seem large, the statute gives
an unpredictable multifactor balancing test that can severely reduce
enforcement rights. As of now, it’s unclear which factors are necessary or
most important.330 Some factors of the Vermont statute may be expensive,
like a patentholder having to seek legal advice for a claim comparison. With
the uncertainty of the law, risk-averse parties might choose not to enforce
their patents. On the other hand, most patentholders are sophisticated
corporations capable of navigating this landscape; small- and medium-sized
businesses might be the only ones greatly affected. Overall, Vermont’s antipatent statute could be an obstacle to patent law’s incentives, but it likely only
complements the incentive to invent.
Incentive to Disclose. If patent rights are weakened, inventors will be
encouraged to seek protection through trade secret law. Pushing inventors to
Id.
See, e.g., id. § 282(b). Before 2017, laches was a possible defense for improper conduct, but
the Supreme Court held that laches couldn’t bar claims for damages in 35 U.S.C. § 286. SCA
Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 959 (2017).
329 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-57 (1989).
330 Note that Vermont’s statutory scheme shifts the burden from alleged infringers to patentholders.
327
328
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trade secret law stymies the incentive to disclose. Although in Kewanee the
Supreme Court didn’t think that inventors would choose trade secret law over
patent law, empirics rebut this.331 But, as noted above, sophisticated
corporations, capable of navigating vague legal landscapes, are unlikely to be
hindered by the anti-patent statute. It is therefore unlikely for the Vermont
statute to discourage disclosure of inventions, at least not more than what the
Supreme Court has already allowed with trade secrets.
National Uniformity. Letting states regulate patent enforcement will most
likely obstruct patent law’s national uniformity in patent enforcement.
Because each state could have diﬀerent requirements, the transaction costs to
learn each state’s requirements could be high. Many states, however, have
modeled their statute on Vermont’s, reducing the potential transaction
costs.332 And again the increased transactions costs might only heavily aﬀect
small- and medium-sized businesses because sophisticated corporations can
navigate diversity in the law and absorb the cost. So because the statute
arguably complements the incentive to invent, wouldn’t burden disclosure
more than trade secret law, and the current landscape of states wouldn’t
fracture enforcement policies, the statute facially survives conﬂict
preemption using Fromer’s framework.
The same is true as applied to MPHJ. As applied to MPHJ, only the
analysis of the incentive to invent and incentive to disclose changes. Here,
the burdens on the patent system are even more tangential and hypothetical.
MPHJ is an NPE, so it doesn’t invent itself. Of course, MPHJ and other
NPEs theoretically contribute to inventing by buying the patents and thus
ﬁnancing the original inventors. But this (theoretical) contribution is far
outweighed by the detriment NPEs cause to the incentive to invent.
Plus, NPEs are unlikely to resort to trade secret law because it isn’t in their
business model. Because NPEs don’t commercialize their inventions, they don’t
have the trade-secret-worthy know-how for licensing. So it’s unlikely that, as
applied to MPHJ, the Vermont statute disturbs Congress’s effectuated balance.
Thus, the Vermont statute will survive conflict preemption.333 But it must
also survive a field-preemption and petitioning-immunity analysis.

331 Fromer, supra note 50, at 284; see, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Trade Secrecy in Willy Wonka’s
Chocolate Factory, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 3, 16 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011)
(“Counter to the Court’s assumption, many of the innovations of the ﬁctional Willy Wonka and the
factual Mars and Hershey appear to be patentable, yet their creators opt for secrecy on the basis that
its protection will outlast the term of patent protection.”).
332 Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1582.
333 The analysis is plainer if the court uses the presumption against preemption because federal law
doesn’t prohibit or require what these laws forbid. So too under the text-centered implied-preemption
approach, as there’s no specific enforcement statute to point to.

2019]

Trolls & the Preemption Dilemma

167

2. Field Preemption
Vermont’s statute is unlikely to be preempted under field preemption.
Federal law invalidates state law when there’s a “scheme of federal
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room to supplement it.”334 A scheme can be so pervasive for two
reasons: (1) because “the federal interest is so dominant” that it
presumptively precludes any role for state law enforcement or (2) because
“the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.”335
Unlike the BPCIA for biosimilar patents in Amgen, the Patent Act has
no comprehensive scheme for enforcement. Only one statute mentions
notice and enforcement, and there are only a few affirmative defenses.
Because of this, Congress has thus far unsuccessfully tried to pass legislation
to elaborate on the field, and agencies like the FTC have started to regulate
enforcement.336 Thus, Vermont’s anti-patent statutes shouldn’t be
invalidated through field preemption.
C. The Rehashed Petition-Immunity Test
My proposed two-part test for piercing petition immunity is: (1) the
litigant’s actions were objectively unreasonable and (2) the litigant is
“indifferent to the outcome of [potential litigation or] litigation itself, but
has nevertheless sought to impose a collateral harm on the defendant.”337 To
determine the objective reasonableness, Judge Posner suggests considering
the probability of winning, the remedy, and the cost of litigation.338 Notably,
the outcome can change based on whether the parties are competitors.339
First, MPHJ’s actions are objectively unreasonable. Here the court
should look to the strength of the case, the possible remedy, and cost of
litigation. MPHJ’s suggestion that its claims covered general products
isn’t very strong. And because MPHJ was targeting small- and mediumsize businesses without large profit margins and these businesses aren’t
competitors, the remedy from the lawsuit doesn’t seem objectively

334 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190,
204 (1983).
335 Id. (cleaned up).
336 Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1636-38.
337 Prof ’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PRE), 508 U.S 49, 68 (1993)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
338 Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982), disapproved of
by PRE, 508 U.S. at 65-66.
339 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205b.
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worthwhile. 340 Every patent-infringement lawsuit is also extremely
expensive with attorney’s fees only granted in exceptional
circumstances.341 Taken together, suing these targets is unreasonable.342
Thus, the first element is satisfied, and the court should go into the
subjective motivation of MPHJ.
Second, MPHJ’s actions show a subjective motivation to abuse the
judicial system. MPHJ repetitively sent demand letters that contained
several false or deceptive facts, asked for an unreasonable decision time,
wasn’t prepared to bring any lawsuit, and didn’t plan on suing. There’s only
one reasonable inference: MPHJ wanted to use the threat of the financial
burdens of the judicial system to force quick settlements. Petition immunity
is therefore pierced. Still, a private party or Vermont’s Attorney General
must prove the requirements of their statute. Because the Vermont statute
is a multifactor balancing test that’s likely a lower standard than the
suggested test, MPHJ would be liable under the statute.
CONCLUSION
This Comment relies on Supreme Court implied-preemption doctrine
and the First Amendment’s Petition Clause doctrine to show the proper
framework for analyzing the validity of state anti-patent laws. This
Comment also shows whether Vermont’s anti-patent laws will survive a
proper conflict-preemption analysis, both facially and as applied to an
infamous patent troll. And this Comment shows whether Vermont’s antipatent laws as applied to an infamous patent troll could satisfy a proper
petition-immunity analysis. This framework suggests that many anti-patent
laws will survive conflict preemption, but that some applications of the
statute might not satisfy the floor of the Constitution.
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340 One could argue that, because patent law grants a right to exclude, if MPHJ sought an
injunction, then the demand letter wouldn’t be objectively unreasonable. This doesn’t change the
objective reasonableness of the actions; this should be considered in the subjective component of
the test. The purpose is to lower the objective bar, so that the court can handle complex cases. Thus,
if MPHJ was genuinely enforcing the patent laws’ right to exclude, then MPHJ would survive the
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342 Perhaps this explains why MPHJ never sued any small businesses and only sued large companies.

